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Abstract 
 
When Yugoslavia dissolved in the 1990s, many Serbs found themselves in new states in which they were not the 
majority population. They often rejected their inclusion in these states, first through political boycotts and then 
through violence and secession. This paper will look at the integration of the Serb community in the new states of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo. The aim is to achieve a clearer picture of the different strategies of 
state-building and group integration in the post-Yugoslav states. The integration of Serbs in these states took place 
in a number of ways:  in Bosnia and Herzegovina they were recognized as one of three constituent peoples (in 
1995), while Croatia awarded Serbs the status of a national minority. In Kosovo (after 2008), Serbs have also been 
recognized as a constituent element of the state and protected by legal equality. Applying the framework of the 
“quadratic nexus”, this paper will look at the interplay of new states, the Serb community, Serbia, and international 
actors in order to assess the current state of Serb integration in these states.  
 
Introduction 
 
Serbs were the largest ethnic group in socialist Yugoslavia.3 Yet they lived not just in the Republic of 
Serbia;  large numbers of Serbs also lived in Croatia (about 12 per cent of the Croatian population was 
Serb in 1991), in Bosnia and Herzegovina (more than one-third of the population of Bosnia was Serb) 
and in Kosovo, a Serbian province with a dominant Albanian population.4 When Yugoslavia fell apart 
in the early 1990s, fundamental questions were asked about the future of the Serbs in Bosnia (some 1.3 
million), in Croatia (around 580,000) and later also about the Serbs in Kosovo (some 195,000).5 The 
main concern was over the role of Serbs in these new states and over their relationship with Serbia. 
These questions had a substantial impact on the political development of Yugoslavia and its successor 
states after 1991, and remain key challenges for the future stability of the whole Western Balkans region. 
Through analysing them, two important dimensions of post-war politics in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo 
                                                     
1 This paper was previously presented at the UACES Annual Conference in Passau, Germany in September 
2012. I am very grateful to the helpful comments received there. I am also grateful to Liza-Franziska Kummrow 
and Trish Moore for their research assistance.    
2 Email: soeren.keil@canterbury.ac.uk  
3 According to the 1991 census in Yugoslavia more than 36 per cent of the overall population of the country was 
Serb. The second largest ethnic group, Croats, comprised fewer than 20 per cent of the population. More 
information on the census and the actual data is available at: 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/yugoslav.jpg, 24.08.2012.  
4 Following the general use, I will shorten Bosnia and Herzegovina to Bosnia.  
5 These numbers are taken from the 1991 census in the Yugoslav Republics and are available via the national 
Statistical Bureaus.  
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will be highlighted. First, the paper discusses how different mechanisms of minority integration have 
been used and how successful they have been. This will provide further explanations for the state-
building and democratization processes that have evolved in the post-Yugoslav states, and have affected 
Serb communities, particularly outside of Serbia. Second, the role of international actors is addressed. 
This cannot be overestimated in questions related to minority rights and Serb community integration in 
Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo. The impact of international actors on the different mechanisms used and 
their insistence on certain forms of Serb integration in these countries has substantially impacted upon 
the post-war development in the three case studies.6  
 
These questions also reflect some of the wider discussions during the break-up of Yugoslavia, 
particularly between those that assumed that the Republics of Yugoslavia had a right to independence 
(such as the Badinter Commission) and those that referred to the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia, in 
which the right for self-determination is given to the peoples of the state. Hence, the fact that the 
republics were not homogenous and that some of the titular nations were spread across different regions 
became a major source of conflict in the aftermath of the declarations of independence of Slovenia and 
Croatia in 1991. Furthermore, as will be shown throughout this paper, the role international actors played 
in the creation – and further development – of these states also heavily impacted upon the role and rights 
of the Serb community in these countries. In short, in countries where international actors were heavily 
involved in state-building and were present “on the ground”, Serbs usually enjoyed a higher degree of 
autonomy and protection.     
 This paper looks at the different integration mechanisms used by international actors and local 
elites to re-integrate and reconcile the Serbs in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo after these states became 
(de facto) independent.7 The majority of Serbs in all three countries opposed the independence of these 
states and indeed fought against it violently.8 Strategies of self-exclusion and secession were used and 
ethnic cleansing was applied to create homogenous Serb statelets that would be able to join Serbia.9 
                                                     
6 Different international actors played a key role in all three countries. While NATO mainly focused on the 
military aspects of de-escalation and de-militarization, the UN supported refugee return and in Kosovo also the 
political transition. In Macedonia, the EU played a particularly important role after the Ohrid Agreement, while 
in Bosnia the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which includes a number of countries involved in the peace 
process, became an important actor, as they oversee the work of the Office of the High Representative.  
7 I use the term de facto independence because I look at Kosovo after 1999, when it was still part of Serbia but 
under the administration of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Kosovo will be treated in this paper as an 
independent country after the declaration of independence by the Kosovo Parliamentary Assembly in February 
2008.  
8 Montenegro will not be considered in this paper, because identities remain fluid in the country and there are no 
special institutional provisions for the integration of the Serb community in Montenegro. For more information 
see Jelena DZANKIC, Lineages of Citizenship in Montenegro. CITSEE Working Papers 2010/14, 
available at: http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/file_download/series/371_lineagesofcitizenshipinmontenegro.pdf, 
12.09.2012.  
9 Neither the Serb statelet Republika Krajna, nor the RS in Bosnia ever joined Serbia or were recognized by 
Serbia. Yet, it is widely established that they were created as part of a strategy for the creation of a Greater 
Serbia, see for example: James GOW The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries. A Strategy of War Crimes. 
London 2003. 
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These strategies were unsuccessful in the case of Bosnia and Croatia. However, the future of Northern 
Kosovo, an area that belongs to the Republic of Kosovo but in which the majority Serbs refuse to 
integrate and remain in control, remains unclear. Leaving the difficult situation in Northern Kosovo 
aside, Serbs have been integrated into the new states via different forms of institutional accommodation, 
as will be made evident throughout the paper. While the dream of a “Greater Serbia” might be over, 
there nevertheless remain a number of open questions about the role of Serbs in these new states, their 
relationship to the kin-state Serbia and the consequences of these complex relationships for peace and 
stability in the Western Balkans. To assess the integration of Serbs in the post-Yugoslav states of Bosnia, 
Croatia and Kosovo, this paper will focus a) on the legal status of Serbs in these three countries; b) the 
existence of reserved seats in parliament; c) the right to use a veto in order to block legislation; d) 
territorial autonomy for the Serb community; and e) cultural autonomy. These five elements can be seen 
as key cornerstones of a wider strategy of minority/group integration in divided societies, and will be 
developed out of a discussion on different forms of minority and group integration in the third part of 
this paper. It is important to highlight that this paper deals only with the legal provisions; it does not aim 
to assess the situation of Serbs “on the ground”; instead, it aims to provide a comparison between the 
different strategies used to integrate the Serb community in the three countries and demonstrate 
important similarities and differences.  
 This paper will progress in three key steps. First, I will look at the Serbs in Bosnia, Croatia, and 
Kosovo and discuss why a comparison of their integration is academically fruitful and might help to 
understand and address other forms of minority integration. In the second part I will examine the 
importance of the political accommodation of “new minorities” and the different institutional models 
that allow for Serb integration in the three countries. Third, I will analyze institutional mechanisms to 
integrate the Serb community in the three states. It will be shown that for the successful integration of 
the Serb community in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo three actors become important, namely the new 
state and its government (Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo), the Serb community in these three countries, 
and finally Serbia as the kin-state of Serbs and a neighboring country to all states under consideration 
in this paper. By doing so, this analysis goes back to the work of Rogers Brubaker, who has emphasized 
the “triadic relational nexus linking national minorities, nationalizing states, and external national 
homelands.”10 The concept, however, needs to be extended, to include the role of external actors; 
therefore the model of the “quadratic nexus” will be applied.11     
 
                                                     
10 Rogers BRUBAKER, National Minorities, Nationalizing States and External National Homelands in the New 
Europe, Daedalus 124 (1995), n. 2, 107-132, p. 107 
11 The Quadratic Nexus assesses the role of national minorities, nationalizing states, external homelands and 
international actors in the process of state-building and democratization. See for example David SMITH, 
Framing the National Question in Central and Eastern Europe: A Quadratic Nexus? The Global Review of 
Ethnopolitics 2 (2002) n.1, 3-16 as well as Gezim KRASNIQI, “Quadratic nexus” and the process of 
democratization and state-building in Albania and Kosovo: a comparison, Nationalities Papers 41 (2013), n.3, 
395-411.  
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Comparing the Serbs in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo 
 
When comparing the integration of the Serbs in the new states of Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo it is 
important to look at some of the common developments in these states. Serbs have lived in all three 
territories for centuries, long before the wars in the 1990s would result in the creation of new states and 
new borders. They have been victimized in the Ottoman Empire, used by the Austrians to protect their 
border with the Ottomans and have always played an important role in the historical development of 
Southeastern Europe. Indeed, the “Serbian Question” was at the forefront of the Balkan Wars at the 
beginning of the twentieth century and at the centre of the Yugoslav Successor Wars at its end.12 Serbs, 
as the largest group in Yugoslavia, were the titular nation in the Republic of Serbia, one of the six 
Yugoslav Republics, but they also had equal rights with Croats in Croatia and were a constituent group 
in Bosnia, along with Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. Serbs controlled Kosovo after 1989 when 
Slobodan Milošević ended Kosovo’s autonomy, until the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) took over in 1999.13 Serbs, consequently, were privileged in the former 
Yugoslavia, not only because they had their own Republic, but also because they enjoyed a privileged 
position in a number of other Republics and parts of the country, namely Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo.14 
Consequently, it was also the Serbs that had the most to lose once Yugoslavia started to disintegrate. 
The Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia were unwilling to live in these states, because they insisted on their 
right to join a Greater Serbia (i.e. a Serb state that would unite all Serbs in Yugoslavia, including 
territories in Bosnia and Croatia where Serbs were living) once the Yugoslav dissolution had been 
confirmed (after the end of the violence in Slovenia). At the same time, Serbs in Kosovo faced the 
opposite dilemma, they had to argue that Kosovo should remain a part of Serbia, despite the fact that 
the overwhelming majority of Kosovo citizens was not Serb and was not willing to live in a Serbian 
nation-state. As the psychologist Toni Petković has described this dilemma for the Serbs is as follows: 
“If they wished to remain united in a single state, they had to fight simultaneously for the self – 
determination of Serbs in other Yugoslav republics, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and against 
the self – determination of minorities within Serbia itself.”15 The Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia excluded 
themselves from these new states by establishing local autonomy and starting violent revolts, followed 
                                                     
12 Ivo BANAC, The National Question in Yugoslavia. Origins, History, Politics. Ithaca 1984; 
James GOW The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries. A Strategy of War Crimes. London 2003; 
V.P. GAGNON Jr., Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia, International Security 19 
(1994/5), n. 3, 130-166.  
13 Kosovo was an autonomous province according to the 1974 Yugoslav constitution. While formally belonging 
to the Socialist Serb Republic, it had its own institutions and representation in the Yugoslav executive. This 
autonomy, which put Kosovo de facto (but not de jure) on par with the Republics of Yugoslavia, was abolished 
by the Serb leadership in 1989,  
14 Additionally it has to be noted that Serbs were also equal in Serbia’s second autonomous province Voijvodina. 
See: Tim JUDAH, The Serbs (History, Myths and the Destruction of Yugoslavia). New Haven, London 2000 (2nd 
edition). 
15 Toni PETKOVIC, Fight for Great Serbia: Myth and Reality, Center for Southeast Europe Working Paper Series 
3 (2009), 1-28, 3, available at: http://www.uni-graz.at/ofre2www_csee_3.pdf, 24.08.2012.    
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by declaring their independence from the new states. In both countries ethnic cleansing was used as a 
key strategy to create ethnically homogenous territories, a legacy that remains important in the political 
discourse today. In Kosovo, it was a different story, because the independence of the former Serbian 
province was the result of an attempt at ethnic cleansing by Serbian security forces in 1998 and 1999, 
which resulted in NATO intervention and the establishment of UN control over Kosovo.16 Earlier 
attempts to integrate the Serbs via power-sharing in Bosnia and through minority rights in Croatia failed, 
mainly due to the radicalization of the local Serb leadership and the influence of Slobodan Milošević, 
who believed that the secession of Serb territories from Croatia and Bosnia was an acceptable solution 
in the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia.17 Many Serbs also voiced reasonable concerns once 
Croatia and Bosnia became independent, in particular pointing out that they would be reduced to 
minority status and dominated by other ethnic groups.18 The leaders of Croatia and Bosnia did little to 
encourage Serbs living in their territory that they had a place in the new states and would be protected 
and recognized.19 Serbs, and particularly their leadership, likewise did little to find compromises and 
seek political solutions with the Croatian and Bosnian elites.   
Serbs in Croatia suffered a decisive military defeat in the summer of 1995, when the secessionist 
regions were overrun by the Croatian army and the majority of Serbs left or were forced to leave. While 
the Serbs in Bosnia suffered military defeats, too, these were not so decisive and a cease-fire was 
negotiated before Croatian and Bosnian troops could conquer the majority of Serb-held territory in 
Bosnia. In Kosovo, many Serbs fled as a result of violence, NATO’s bombing, and the establishment of 
UN authority in 1999; and many more followed in the coming years after continued violence against 
Serbs, despite the active promotion of peace and cooperation by the UN and the work of the Kosovo 
Force (KFOR) military units on the ground. Serbs consequently had to accept that their aims of secession 
from Bosnia and Croatia failed and that these states would become independent in their original 
Republican borders. Furthermore, Serbia lost control over Kosovo as a result of NATO airstrikes, and 
when Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, it further complicated relations with the Serb 
community in Kosovo and with Serbia.20 In the three countries Serbs     not only saw themselves as the 
losers of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the establishment of the new states, but indeed emphasized 
their role as victims of nationalist policies and violence in the post-Yugoslav states. This fits into a wider 
                                                     
16 Florian BIEBER / Zidas DASKALOVSKI, (eds.), Understanding the War in Kosovo. London, Portland 2001   
17 Nina CASPERSEN, Belgrade, Pale, Knin: Kin-State Control over Rebellious Puppets? Europe-Asia Studies 59 
(2007), n. 4, 621-641.  
18 For a discussion on different Serb perspectives during the break-up of Yugoslavia, see the personal memoir of 
Mirko Pejanović, a Bosnian Serb academic, who joined the Bosnian government during the war. Mirko 
PEJONOVIĆ, Through Bosnian Eyes. The Political Memoir of a Bosnian Serb. West Lafayette 2004.  
19 Croatia’s President Tuđman made it very clear in his speeches that he saw Croatia as a nation-state of Croats 
in which Serbs would be reduced to a minority with limited rights. While their legal status was more protected in 
Bosnia after 1990, the push for independence of Bosnia by Bosniak and Croat elites alienated the Serb leadership 
and many Serbs, and gave a clear indication that they would be dominated by a Bosniak-Croat alliance in an 
independent Bosnia.  
20 Serbia has not recognized Kosovo and continues to treat it as part of its own territory. Serbian authorities 
consider Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence as illegal.  
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pattern of Serb engagement with other ethnic groups in the Western Balkans, namely the emphasis on 
Serb victimhood and suffering.21 In this discourse it was the Serb nation that had become displaced 
throughout the post-Yugoslav states and now had to live as a minority in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo. 
This discourse of Serb suffering and victimhood stands in stark contrast to the discourse among Croats 
in Croatia, Bosniaks in Bosnia, and Albanians in Kosovo. They saw Serbs as the main perpetrators, as 
war criminals, and indeed saw Serbia as the pariah of the new states. 
The ‘triadic nexus’ that Brubaker describes as a key element of group integration is very 
important for the analysis of the Serb integration into Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo. Furthermore, the role 
of the international community cannot be overestimated, particularly in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, 
but also in the case of Croatia. Thus the discussion on Serb integration in these new states needs to look 
at the Serb community, the politics of these new states, the role of Serbia, and the actions and 
involvement of different international actors.  
While many Serbs chose to leave or were forced to leave their homes during the conflicts, many 
stayed and had to integrate into the new states.  Over the years many returned to their homes, in particular 
to Bosnia and Croatia.22 The experiences of Serbs in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo are therefore similar 
in a number of ways. Serbs in all three countries lost or feared to lose their privileged position once 
these states declared their desire to become independent and consequently attempted to secede. These 
secession attempts, the Republic of Srpska Krajina in Croatia and the Republika Srpska in Bosnia were, 
however, defeated militarily and many Serbs became victims of the very nationalist discourses that their 
leaders had instigated. The Serbs in Kosovo also opposed the former province’s independence. Those 
Serbs that remained in Kosovo after NATO’s bombing campaign used similar strategies to the Serbs in 
Bosnia and Croatia. The Serbs in Northern Kosovo excluded themselves from the new Kosovan state, 
while Serbs in other parts of Kosovo had to make arrangements with the new state authorities. This gave 
rise to legends about Serb oppression in the new states similar to those used earlier to legitimize the 
secession attempts of nationalist Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia and to those used today by the Serbs in 
Northern Kosovo to underline their desire to join Serbia.23 At the same time, the re-integration of Serbs 
into Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo was difficult because Serbs were seen as the main aggressors by 
members of the other ethnic groups in the three countries. They were stigmatized and in some cases 
openly discriminated against. Serbia’s role in the integration of the Serb communities into the three 
countries has also not been without its problems. Until today Serbia remains a strong protector of the 
Serbs in Bosnia and Kosovo. Furthermore, attempts at Serb integration were also hindered by the 
                                                     
21 Florian BIEBER, Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering: The Kosovo myth from 600th 
anniversary to the present, Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice 6 (2002), n. 1, 95-110;  
Stef JANSEN, ‘Why Do They Hate Us?’ Everyday Serbian Nationalist Knowledge of Muslim Hatred, Journal of 
Mediterranean Studies 13 (2010), n. 2, 215-237;  
JUDAH, The Serbs (History, Myths and the Destruction of Yugoslavia).  
22 The Serb exodus from Kosovo continues.   
23 ICG, Setting Kosovo Free: Remaining Challenges. Europe Report No. 218 (2012c), available at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2012/europe/setting-kosovo-free-remaining-
challenges.aspx, 13.09.2012.  
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political elites in the new countries. As will be shown below, Croatia’s government until 2000 had no 
interest in integrating and engaging with the Serb community, and even after 2000 Serb integration 
occurred mainly as a result of pressure from the European Union (EU) and other international bodies 
(such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe). The continued tensions between Kosovo Albanians and 
Serbs, most visibly the 2004 violent prosecution, also demonstrate how Serb integration there was 
neither smooth nor without conflict after 1999. In Bosnia, tensions remained high after 1995, and the 
state did not start to function properly until 1998, when international actors stepped in to implement 
many important reforms.  
 
Different concepts of minority integration in new states 
 
The forms of minority protection to be found in the three countries are the result of actions taken by the 
Serb communities in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo, as well as actions taken by the respective 
governments of these countries. Additionally, one should not underestimate the role of Belgrade, 
particularly during the conflicts in the countries, but also through to the present day as the kin-state and 
“protector” of the Serb minority in the three new states. Brubaker’s concept of nationalizing state vs. 
minority nation vs. kin-state therefore finds confirmation and helps us in explaining the current state of 
minority protection in all three states.24 He argues that there is a  
“dynamic interplay between a set of new or newly reconfigured nationalizing states, ethnically 
heterogeneous yet conceived as nation states, whose dominant elites promote (to varying degrees) the 
language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, and political hegemony of the nominally 
state-bearing nation; the substantial, self-conscious, and (to varying degrees) organized and politically 
alienated national minorities in those states, whose leaders demand cultural or territorial autonomy and 
resist actual or perceived policies or processes of assimilation or discrimination, and the external national 
“homelands” of these minorities, whose elites (again to varying degrees) closely monitor the situation of 
their co-ethnics in the new states, vigorously protest alleged violations of their rights, and assert , even 
the obligation, to defend their interests.”25  
 
Additionally, as it will become clearer through what follows that international actors played a key role 
in the development and implementation of Serb rights in these three countries, Brubaker’s concept will 
be extended by a fourth dimension into a “quadratic nexus”, incorporating the international actors.  
 
When Croatia and Bosnia declared their independence in 1991 and 1992 respectively, neither 
country could consider itself an homogenous nation-state. About 12 per cent of the Croat population and 
                                                     
24 BRUBAKER, National Minorities, Nationalizing States and External National Homelands in the New Europe.  
Rogers BRUBAKER, Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. 
Cambridge et al. 1996.  
25 BRUBAKER, National Minorities, Nationalizing States and External National Homelands in the New Europe, 
109-110 (emphasis in original).  
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one-third of the Bosnian population declared themselves as ethnic Serbs in the last Yugoslav census of 
1991.26 In Kosovo, the census showed that ten per cent declared themselves as ethnic Serbs in the same 
year. All three countries were therefore multinational rather than mono-national and the new state 
structures needed to take this into account.27 This was a key requirement, which the Badinter 
Commission outlined in November 1991, when it stated "that the Serbian population in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Croatia is entitled to all the rights concerned to minorities and ethnic groups [...]" and 
"that the Republics must afford the members of those minorities and ethnic groups all the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms recognized in international law, including, where appropriate, the right to 
choose their nationality."28 The protection of the Serb community via minority and group rights was 
therefore a key precondition for the international recognition of Bosnia and Croatia. In the case of 
Kosovo it was also an international framework that provided for the need of Serb minority protection 
and integration. The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, outlined by former 
Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari stated that “Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society…” and that 
“Inhabitants belonging to the same national or ethnic, linguistic, or religious group traditionally present 
on the territory of Kosovo […] shall have specific rights […], in addition to the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms provided for in […] this Settlement.”29   
While the Serbian government fiercely rejected the Ahtisaari Plan, it is nevertheless important 
to recognize that the respect and protection of minority nations, and particularly the Serb community, 
was of key importance for international actors in the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the 
recognition of new states. However, many Serbs in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo opposed their 
integration into the new states and fought against it violently. As a result of these conflicts many Serbs 
had to leave the countries and their pre-war homes and the numbers of Serbs in Croatia and Kosovo 
have been reduced drastically.30 The drastic reduction of the Serb population in Croatia and Kosovo, but 
also the outbreak of inter-group violence in all three countries in the process of them becoming 
independent can be seen as a failure of effective Serb integration by these new states, as well as a sign 
of the unwillingness of the Serb communities to accept them. While states have many options to 
                                                     
26 In addition, 17 per cent of the Bosnian population declared themselves as ethnic Croat.  
27 It is also important that there are a number of other minorities living on the territories of these three states, 
including Jews, Roma, Balkan Egyptians, and Montenegrins. People from mixed marriages would often label 
themselves as “Yugoslavs” before the war rather than choosing one side of identification. 
28 The European Community Arbitration Committee for the former Yugoslavia (also referred to as Badinter 
Commission) was a legal organisation composed of a number of high-profile judges from numerous European 
countries, which examined the legal nature of the Yugoslav dissolution and concluded that "the Socialist Federative 
Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution." (All quotes from the conclusions of the Commission are 
taken from Alain PELLET, The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-
Determination of Peoples, European Journal of International Law 3 (1992), n. 1, 178-185.). The Committee would 
recommend that the European Community (EC) should recognize the Republics, if their declaration of 
independence was preceded by a referendum and if they demonstrate a commitment to the protection of minority 
rights.  
29 Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, Art. 1.1 and 3.1, (2007), available at: 
http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/Comprehensive%20Proposal%20.pdf, 26.08.2012.   
30 In the census of 2001, 4.5 per cent of the population of Croatia considered themselves as ethnic Serbs. It is 
estimated that about 4-5 per cent of the current population of Kosovo are Serbs.   
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integrate minority nations, the most relevant ones for our paper are integration through the protection of 
minority rights, protection through autonomy (either territorial or cultural), and protection through 
power-sharing.31  
 It has become internationally recognized that minority nations should have a right to cultural, 
linguistic, and religious protection and that states have the obligation to protect these rights. In Europe, 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities has become one of the most 
detailed legal provisions about the obligations of states towards minority nations on their territory.32 The 
Convention states in Article 5.1 that “The Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for 
persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the 
essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage.” 
The basic framework provided by the Convention and other international protection frameworks, such 
as the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe’s (OSCE) High Commissioner on National 
Minorities focuses on fundamental human rights for minorities as well as additional cultural rights 
connected to their national customs and history. According to these international frameworks, states 
have the obligation to treat minority nations equally and provide them with additional rights so that they 
practise their own language, religion, and culture. One way to ensure this is by granting minority nations 
cultural autonomy. This means that all members identifying with one group enjoy the same cultural 
rights to enable them to practise and protect their own national identity, customs, and tradition.33  
Another form of minority integration is territorial autonomy. This is often granted through 
specific decentralization or federalization processes in which territories that are inhabited by a minority 
nation receive more decision-making autonomy. Processes of decentralization and federalization in 
Spain, Belgium, and the United Kingdom have addressed the demands of minority nations for territorial 
autonomy and self-governance. However, Belgium and Canada are also good examples, illustrating also 
some of the limits of territorial autonomy. Questions about the degree of autonomy and inter-group 
relations often play a key role in countries that choose to implement forms of territorial autonomy. 
Furthermore, asymmetrical forms of decentralization, as practised in Spain and the UK, have resulted 
in political conflicts and discussions about the unequal treatment of groups and citizens in states.34  
Finally, power-sharing has been a key strategy for the promotion of peace and democracy in 
divided societies. There are different forms of power-sharing, which often include elements of cultural 
                                                     
31 For different strategies of minority integration, see: Alexis HERACLIDES, Ethnicity, Secessionist Conflict and 
the International Society: Towards Normative Paradigm Shift, Nations and Nationalism 3 (1997), n. 4, 493-520 
There are ongoing debates in the academic literature about the use of population transfers as effective mechanisms 
of minority protection. See for example Chaim D. KAUFMANN, When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population 
Transfers and Partition in the Twentieth Century, International Security 23 (1998), n. 2, 120-156.  
32 Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995), available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/1_AtGlance/PDF_H(1995)010_FCNM_ExplanReport_en.pdf, 
26.08.2012. 
33 Ephraim NIMNI, National Cultural Autonomy as an Alternative to Minority Nationalism, Ethnopolitics 3 
(2007), n. 3, 345-364; 
34 Will KYMLICKA, Federalism and Secession: At Home and Abroad, Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 13 (2000), n. 2, 207-224.  
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and/or territorial autonomy. In practice, the most common form of power-sharing as an instrument of 
minority protection is consociationalism.35 Consociationalism, according to Arend Lijphart, is defined 
by four core elements, namely elite cooperation through grand coalitions, proportional representation, 
(minority) veto rights, and autonomy for minority nations.36   
 Which of these integration strategies is being used depends on a number of factors. As will be 
shown, Bosnia and Herzegovina had a tradition of ethnic power-sharing between Bosniaks, Bosnian 
Croats, and Bosnian Serbs. This form of power-sharing existed during the Communist period as well as 
after the first free elections in 1991. Hence, once the war had ended, power-sharing was re-introduced 
and formalized in the Bosnian Constitution, which is part of the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequently, it can be argued that historical experiences, but also 
the continued existence of a large number of Serbs in Bosnia, were the main reasons for the formal 
introduction of institutionalized power-sharing and territorial autonomy. This is different to Croatia, 
where Croats and Serbs were treated equally and where both had the status of a constituent nation under 
Communist rule. However, once the HDZ (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, Croatian Democratic 
Union) won the free elections and Franjo Tuđman became President, the country underwent a strong 
“nationalizing” policy, which was characterized by the departure of Serbs from the public 
administration, the use of Croat national symbols and the reduction of the Serb population to the status 
of a national minority. As the academic Nenad Zakošek describes, “The new regime was […] 
characterized by a strong anti-Serb sentiment. In particular, it rejected all power-sharing mechanisms 
and the privileged veto powers previously given to the Serb minority in Croatia. The inclination was 
towards […] defining Croatia as a nation-state of Croats.”37 After the end of violence, which resulted in 
victory for the Croat forces and the departure of a large segment of the Serb community, the Serbs were 
offered cultural autonomy. They had to accept, despite having refused the same rights in 1991 and 
having attempted to secede from Croatia. The provision of cultural autonomy for Serbs in Croatia is 
therefore the result of the nationalizing policies of the first Croat government and the military victory of 
the Croat government forces over the Serb separatists in 1995.  
Kosovo is a unique case and differs in many respects from Bosnia and Croatia. The 
institutionalization of minority rights for Serbs in Kosovo was preceded by the Serbian attempt to 
ethnically cleanse the province and by NATO’s subsequent intervention in 1999. As a result, Serbia lost 
de facto sovereignty over the area in 1999 when UNMIK was established as the holder of sovereignty 
and political power. Many Serbs left Kosovo after 1999, despite the UN Mission’s strong focus on the 
multi-cultural nature of Kosovo and its insistence on representation of Serbs and other minorities in the 
                                                     
35 Arend LIJPHART, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, Journal of Democracy 15 (2004), n. 2, 96-109; 
Arend LIJPHART, Non-Majoritarian Democracy: A Comparison of Federal and Consociational Theories, 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 15 (1985), n. 2, 3-15;  
Arend LIJPHART, Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration. New Haven 1977.  
36 Arend LIJPHART, Consociational Democracy, World Politics 22 (1969), n. 2, 207-225.  
37 Nenad ŽAKOŠEK, Democratization, State-building and War: The Cases of Serbia and Croatia,  
Democratization 15 (2008), n. 3, 588-610, 598.  
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first self-governing institutions. Nevertheless, a lack of economic development, new inter-ethnic 
violence, and the continued insecurity in Kosovo have result in an ongoing exodus of Serbs from the 
statelet. Having said this, in terms of institutional protection the already mentioned Ahtisaari Plan had 
foreseen a high level of protection for Serbs and other minorities and most of these provisions have been 
institutionalized in the independent Kosovo. The Serbs in Kosovo remain, however, divided over their 
role in the new state. While some Serbs in the South of Kosovo, who mainly live in enclaves, have 
started to cooperate with the government in Pristina, those in the North show no willingness to integrate 
into Kosovo and consider the state illegal.38 The current minority protection regime in Kosovo is 
therefore the result of Serbia’s actions in the former province, NATO’s intervention, and UNMIK’s 
attempt to build a multiethnic society. Furthermore, a high degree of autonomy for the Serbs in Kosovo 
was the price the Albanian majority had to pay for its demand of independence from Belgrade.  
 
The next section compares and contrasts the institutionalized forms of Serb integration in Bosnia, 
Croatia, and Kosovo in more detail. In doing so it analyzes some of the key features of the “triadic 
nexus” and the role of the international community.   
 
Institutionalizing Serb minority protection in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo        
 
Legal Status and Institutional Representation 
As a brief summary we can say that Croatia grants Serbs protection through the status of a national 
minority, while Bosnia and Kosovo have institutionalized the protection of the Serb community further. 
In Kosovo, Serbs are a constituent nation and Serbian is an official language. There are also reserved 
seats in parliament and government for Serb representatives and Serb municipalities enjoy a high degree 
of self-government. In Bosnia, Serbs have “their own” territorial unit, namely the Republika Srpska 
(RS), which covers 49 per cent of the Bosnian territory.39 Furthermore, Serbs are one of three constituent 
peoples (along with Bosniaks and Croats) and enjoy representation in parliament, government, and the 
Constitutional Court. They also enjoy a number of veto rights and have to be represented proportionally 
in the administration.40 While the discussion above helped in explaining the different levels and 
                                                     
38 ICG, Setting Kosovo Free: Remaining Challenges. 
Stefan LEHNE, Kosovo and Serbia: Toward a Normal Relationship, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace Policy Outlook (2012), available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Kosovo_and_Serbia.pdf, 
13.09.2013. 
39 The other unit, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) covers 51 per cent of the territory and is made 
up of 10 cantons. Furthermore, the District of Brčko enjoys self-government and is a multinational unit. For more 
on Bosnia’s complex federal system see Soeren KEIL, Multinational Federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Farnham and Burlington 2013; Soeren KEIL, Federalism as a Tool of Conflict Resolution: The Case of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Le Europe En Formation 363 (2012), 205-218 and Soeren KEIL, Mythos und Realität eines 
Ethnischen Föderalismus in Bosnien und Herzegowina, Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 50 (2010), n. 1, 76-86.  
40 This privileged position of Serbs in Bosnia has been criticized by a number of Bosniak politicians, who argue 
that the RS is the result of genocide and should be abolished. See for example Marc LOWEN, Ethnic Rifts 
Overshadow Bosnia Elections, BBC News Bosnia-Hercegovina (2010), available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-europe-11451644, 17.09.2012. 
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institutional mechanisms to integrate the Serb community in the three countries, this integration 
nevertheless needs some further consideration. As mentioned, Croatia differs from Bosnia and Kosovo 
in its categorization of Serbs as a national minority. In Bosnia, Serbs are a constituent people and in 
Kosovo they enjoy equal rights to the Albanian majority population. This has far-reaching institutional 
consequences. The use of Serbian and the Cyrillic alphabet, for example, is only allowed in Serb 
designated schools in Croatia and laws of the central government are published in the Latin script only, 
while in Bosnia and Kosovo Serbian enjoys the status of an official language and all laws of the central 
government are also published in Serbian. While the major Serb party in Croatia, the Independent 
Democratic Serb Party (SDSS, short for: Samostalna demokratska srpska stranka) has been involved in 
a number of coalition governments in Croatia since 2000, there is no legal requirement for the 
participation of Serbs in the government of Croatia. This is different to Bosnia and Kosovo.  
 
In Kosovo, the Constitution outlines in Article 96 (3 and 4) that at least one minister must come from 
the Serb community and that two deputy ministers must also be Serbs. In Bosnia, while there is no direct 
rule on the ethnic composition of the government, Article V.4.b states that “No more than two-thirds of 
all Ministers may be appointed from the territory of the Federation. The Chair shall also nominate 
Deputy Ministers (who shall not be of the same constituent people as their Ministers), who shall take 
office upon the approval of the House of Representatives.”41 While this is a requirement for territorial, 
rather than ethnic representation in the Council of Ministers, in practice it has always been the case that 
at least one Bosnian Serb party has been represented in the governing coalition.42 This means that while 
there is de jure the possibility of excluding Serbs from government coalitions, de facto this is not possible 
because of the electoral dominance of Serbs in the Republika Srpska. Bosnia has seen numerous changes 
to its institutional architecture since 1995, which mainly strengthened the state and weakened the ethno-
national and exclusive identity of the entities, but nationalist parties remain of key importance in 
Bosnia’s political system.43 Furthermore, while refugee return has been high on the agenda, Serbs remain 
the absolute majority in the RS.44 This means that Serb parties always dominate the elections in the RS 
and therefore ensure Serb representation in those institutions, which are characterized by territorial 
rather than ethnic keys. It highlights the fact that in Bosnia, all territorial issues are also ethnic issues, 
because of the ethnic homogeneity of the RS and the cantons in the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (FBiH).45  
                                                     
41 The Bosnian Constitution is available at: http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=372, 26.08.2012. 
Kosovo’s Constitution is available at: 
http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf, 26.08.2012. 
42 Soeren KEIL, Mythos und Realität eines Ethnischen Föderalismus in Bosnien und Herzegowina, Südosteuropa 
Mitteilungen 50 (2010), n. 1, 76-86.  
43 Florian BIEBER, After Dayton, Dayton? The Evolution of an Unpopular Peace, Ethnopolitics 5 (2006a), n. 1, 
15-31. 
44 It is estimated that about 90-95 per cent of the RS population are ethnic Serbs. See for example Florian BIEBER, 
Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance. Basingstoke 2006b 
45 BIEBER, Post-War Bosnia 
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Reserved Seats 
All three countries reserve seats for members of the Serbian community in their parliaments. In Croatia, 
there has been a more incremental change over time towards the Serbian minority. They have three seats 
guaranteed in parliament and have been able to join a number of coalition governments. In Kosovo, 
there are ten seats reserved in parliament. Yet because a large number of Serbs does not recognize the 
independence of Kosovo, these seats are often filled by Serbs that run on the list of the major (Albanian) 
parties and are therefore not directly representing the interests of the Serb community. In Bosnia, there 
is no direct regulation about the representation of Serbs in the lower chamber, the House of 
Representatives, but the Constitution states that one third of the Members of the House of 
Representatives has to be elected in the RS, which means that these seats are usually filled by Serbs. 
Bosnia’s upper chamber, the House of Peoples, consists of 15 members of which five have to be Serbs, 
appointed by the National Assembly of the RS.  
 
When comparing the parliamentary representation of Serbs in the three countries one key conclusion 
sticks out, namely that size matters. While there is no guarantee for Serbs in the Bosnian lower house 
(in practice they always count for one third of the total number of MPs), in the upper house Serbs have 
five reserved seats. Not only is this an indication  of  the mixed nature of territorial and ethnic 
representation in Bosnia, but empirical evidence from the last 17 years demonstrates that there is no 
single political decision that can be taken in Bosnia without agreement from the dominant Serb parties.46 
This is very different to Croatia and Kosovo. In Croatia there is no rule stating that Serbs have to be 
involved in government or enjoy any form of veto over governmental legislation. While Serbs in Kosovo 
have reserved seats in the government, their influence is marginal mainly due to self-exclusion. The 
Serbs that participate in Kosovo’s government are usually members of the large parties in Kosovo, which 
are dominated by Kosovo Albanians. The majority of the Kosovo Serbs does not recognize the country 
and does not participate in elections.47 The Serbs that are elected into parliament and government 
therefore do not truly represent the interests of the Serb community. It is therefore clear that addressing 
                                                     
46 Florian BIEBER / Soeren KEIL, Power-Sharing Revisited: Lessons Learnt in the Balkans? Review on Central 
and East European Law 34 (2009), n. 4, 337-360.  
Joseph MARKO, Post-conflict Reconstruction through State- and Nation-building: The Case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, European Diversity and Autonomy Papers 4 (2005), available at: http://www.uni-
graz.at/en/print/opv1www_2005_edap04.pdf, 13.09.2012. 
47 Oisín TANSEY, Democratization Without a State: Democratic Regime-Building in Kosovo, Democratization 
14 (2007), n. 1, 129-150.  
ICG, Kosovo and Serbia: A Little Goodwill Could Go a Long Way, Europe Report No. 215 (2012b), available at: 
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the issue of Serb integration in Kosovo is a key element of Kosovo’s state-building and democratization 
agenda.48 
 
 
Veto Rights  
While Serbs enjoy representation in all three parliaments, they do not have guaranteed veto rights in all 
three cases. There is no special mechanism in Croatia that foresees any form of veto rights for the Serb 
community or any other minorities in the country. This can be explained by the relatively small size of 
the Serb community in Croatia and means in practice that Serbs are able to influence policy in Croatia 
only when the SDSS joins majority coalitions. In Kosovo, there are no direct veto rights for the Serb 
community. However, they have indirect veto rights in the case of defined vital interests (Article 81) 
and constitutional changes (Article 144 (2)). This means that changes to the constitution and to the laws 
on municipalities, rights of the Communities, language rights, local elections, cultural heritage, religion, 
education, and symbols require special majorities. In the case of constitutional changes, this is a two 
thirds majority of the Assembly including a two thirds majority of the representatives of the different 
Communities. In the case of the laws on vital interests a majority of both the Assembly and of the 
representatives of the different Communities is required. The use of special majorities has become a 
more prominent feature in power-sharing systems and this can be seen as a form of institutional learning 
from the complex case of institutionalized veto rights in Bosnia.49 There are three forms of veto rights 
in Bosnia, namely territorial veto rights, ethnic veto rights, and special majorities. Article 4 of Bosnia’s 
Constitution outlines the composition of the two parliamentary chambers and details veto rights for the 
ethnic groups in the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives in Paragraph 3. Additionally, 
Article 5, Paragraph 2 outlines the right of a national interest veto for a member of the Presidency, which 
would then be referred to the entity parliaments for consideration. Special majorities are required in the 
case of constitutional changes (a two thirds majority in each House) while all legislation needs the 
approval of both Houses of the Parliamentary Assembly. Legislation can only be approved if certain 
quorums are met and representatives of all three constituent peoples are present and agree on the 
legislation. This is an indirect form of veto rights, which has been used extensively, namely veto by 
absence.50 It is also often used as a threat to paralyze Bosnia’s institutions; in particular the Bosnian 
Serbs have frequently threatened to boycott central institutions over recent years.51  
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State, CITSEE Working Paper 2010/10, available at: 
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Territorial Autonomy 
A further distinction between Serb integration in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo can be made when 
looking at the degree of territorial autonomy granted to the Serb community in these countries. In 
Croatia, there are no formal territorial rights for the Serb community; all rights granted to them via the 
Constitutional Law on National Minority Rights are cultural. While municipalities with a Serb majority 
have the right to closer cooperation with each other to protect these cultural rights, there is an absence 
of any form of territorial autonomy for the Serb community. In fact, Article 1 of the Croatian 
Constitution states that “The Republic of Croatia is a unitary and indivisible democratic welfare state.”52 
In particular the government of President Franjo Tuđman had no interest in decentralization, because it 
feared regional opposition - and indeed attempts at secession  - by those regions that were predominantly 
Serb. The fact that this came true in the Croatian Wars of 1991 and 1995 is a key reason for Croatia’s 
relative centralization even today.53  
 
In contrast to the situation in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo grant different forms of territorial autonomy 
to the Serb community. As already mentioned, the RS is one of two entities in Bosnia. It is mainly 
inhabited by Serbs and has a high degree of autonomy, which includes responsibilities for economic 
development, its own financial resources, decision-making powers in the areas of education, police, 
media, culture, environmental protection, and even limited competences in foreign policy. In fact, until 
2005, the RS had its own military and border police and its own Value-Added-Tax regime. When Bosnia 
re-integrated as a unified country after the war in 1995 the entities were the main holders of decision-
making competences and centralization was only a gradual process, starting in 1997, when the powers 
of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) (the international observer over the implementation of 
the peace agreement) were extended.54 Since then the RS has lost some of its competences (such as its 
own military and control over the border service) but has remained a key holder of competences in 
Bosnia’s highly decentralized federal system. Since 2006 there have also been new attempts by the 
Bosnian Serb leadership to resist more centralization and indeed claim powers back from the central 
institutions in Sarajevo.55 Furthermore, Serbs also enjoy representation in Bosnia’s other entity, the 
                                                     
52 The Croatian Constitution is available at: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=246241, 
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FBiH, where they have reserved seats at entity and cantonal level (since 2006). Yet they enjoy no 
territorial or cultural autonomy as such within the FBiH. In Kosovo, decentralization was a key element 
of the Ahtisaari Plan to ensure a high level of self-rule for Serb municipalities. While it took a long time 
for decentralization to be implemented once Kosovo became independent, it is generally considered as 
one of the more successful elements of democratization and state-building in Kosovo.56 When looking 
more in detail at decentralization in Kosovo it becomes obvious that there is a clear division between 
the relatively successful integration of Serb enclaves in the South of Kosovo, that have profited from 
decentralization and enjoy some limited forms of decision-making particularly in health care and 
education, and the problematic situation in the Serb municipalities in Northern Kosovo, which do not 
recognize Kosovo as an independent state and continue to boycott all attempts of re-integration into 
Kosovo. While some progress has been made on Serb-Albanian relations in Kosovo in the light of the 
2013 Brussels Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, its implementation remains problematic. The 
Kosovo Serbs in the North of the country have so far resisted different attempts at re-integration and it 
remains to be seen to what extent pressure from Belgrade can push them towards cooperation with 
Prishtina.57 Like Bosnia, Kosovo remains dependent on international support, and the vision of a multi-
ethnic society in both cases is not fully compatible with the reality of ethnic separation and inter-group 
insecurity.58   
 
Cultural Autonomy 
When comparing the institutional integration of Serbs in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo a further point of 
comparison would be the provision of cultural autonomy for the Serb community. As discussed above, 
Croatia grants Serbs cultural autonomy, which focuses on the use of the Serbian language, cultural and 
religious autonomy, and some rights in education. In particular the participation of minority parties in 
the 2003 coalition government has resulted in better access for Serbs to jobs in the public service and a 
better implementation of the new Constitutional Law on National Minorities.59 Igor Štiks argued in this 
context that although the Serbs have become more included, Croatia still retains its ethnocentric 
conception of the state, at the same time allowing for some inclusion of ethnic minorities – so long as 
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they do not challenge the majority.60 This also explains why rights were limited to some form of cultural 
autonomy. Yet, more recent discussions on the use of the Cyrillic alphabet in Vukovar and other parts 
of Croatia demonstrate that while the legal framework provides some basic rights for Serbs in the 
country, in practice these remain contested, while the picture of Serbs as the aggressor and enemy often 
prevails in the dominant Croat discourse. In Bosnia, there is no cultural autonomy for groups as such. 
All rights are connected to territories and Serbs living in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina do 
not enjoy special forms of cultural autonomy. In Kosovo, all minorities enjoy special rights in the field 
of culture, education, and language rights. This has been a key element of the Ahtisaari Plan and has 
particularly favoured the Serbs as the largest minority group in Kosovo, as they can use their own 
language, have their own education system, and protect their own culture.  
  
Institutional Provisions and the Triadic Nexus 
When comparing the integration of the Serb community in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo a number of 
important issues have emerged. First, these new states use different instruments to integrate the Serb 
community. These can be minority rights, reserved seats in parliament and/or in the government, and 
territorial and cultural autonomy. The specific set of rights and institutional participation granted to the 
Serb community depends on a number of factors: first, the size of the Serbian community in the country; 
second, the development of minority-majority relations in the process of the break-up of Yugoslavia; 
and finally, the pressure of international actors on majorities to implement certain protections and 
institutional participation mechanisms for the integration of the Serb community. Furthermore, Serbia 
itself has also had an impact on the protection regime in these countries, particularly in Kosovo, where 
it has been the main negotiator on behalf of the Kosovo Serbs.  
Second, integration strategies and inter-ethnic relations have changed over time and this has had 
an influence on the role of the Serbs in these new states. The best example of this development is Croatia. 
The government of Franjo Tuđman purposely undermined the integration and return of many Serbs in 
Croatia, so that important reforms and administrative changes took place only after the democratization 
of Croatia in 2000.  To this day relations remain constrained by questions over property return and the 
glorification of Croat and Serb war criminals as national heroes. The situation in Bosnia has also 
changed over time and the Serbs have become more integrated into the state and actively participate in 
its joint institutions. However, they enjoy a high degree of autonomy and since 2006 there has been a 
stronger discussion about the autonomy of the RS and the future of Serbs in Bosnia. Discussions of Serb 
independence from Bosnia have reemerged in the light of a permanent political crisis in Bosnia since 
2006.61 In Kosovo the situation remains fragile, as Serbs in the South of the country have chosen to 
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cooperate with the Kosovar institutions, while Serbs North of the Ibar river continue to uphold their self-
governance and reject any attempt at integration. It remains to be seen if the Brussels Agreement of 
April 2013 between Serbia and Kosovo will enable the integration of Serbs in Northern Kosovo into the 
Kosovan state.  
Third, it has to be pointed out that Serbia plays a key role in the integration of the Serb 
community in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo. Serbia’s impact on the integration of Serbs in the 
neighboring countries can be both positive and negative. In the case of Croatia, there has been a gradual 
change over time. While Serbia under Milošević used the Croatian Serb refugees as political hostages 
to promote its policy and blame Croatian nationalism for the war and ethnic cleansing, there has been a 
genuine change in Serbia-Croatia relations since 2000. Both countries transitioned to democracy and 
that affected the integration of the Serbs in Croatia, for example when the visa for travels to Serbia was 
abolished for Croatian citizens. While there remain general disputes about the interpretation of the 
events between 1991 and 1995, the situation in both countries has nevertheless massively improved as 
they have both aimed for integration into the EU. Frameworks such as the Stability Pact for Southeastern 
Europe and its successor the Regional Cooperation Council have helped in establishing important 
relations on political, economic, and societal levels. This has helped Croatian Serbs to re-integrate into 
Croatia and still keep close links with their kin-state Serbia. However, some important issues remain, in 
particular in terms of the property claims of Serbs who fled from Croatia in 1995 and are now returning, 
and in questions concerning dual citizenship. In Bosnia, Serbia continued to undermine the re-
integration of the state after 1995 by supporting the economic and political integration of the RS into 
Serbia. However, once the international community stepped up its game in Bosnia and extended the 
powers of the High Representative, Serbia demonstrated its willingness to support the international state-
building agenda.  
Nonetheless, all Serbian governments (including those after the democratic changes of 2000) 
have acted as the protectors of the interests of the RS and the Serbs in Bosnia. According to Article 2a 
of the Bosnian Constitution, “The Entities shall have the right to establish special parallel relationships 
with neighboring states consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.” The RS is therefore allowed to have special “parallel” relations with Serbia in a number 
of policy areas, including education and culture. However, these special relations should not be used to 
undermine the authority of the Bosnian state institutions and so far Bosniaks and Croats have continued 
to be critical of the relationship between the RS and Serbia. The Serbs in Kosovo too are allowed to 
have special relationships with Serbia in the areas of education, health care, and culture. However, 
because a part of the Kosovo Serbs refuses to integrate into Kosovo, there is an ongoing debate about 
the links between Kosovo, Serbia, and the Kosovo Serbs.62 Article 13 of the 2006 Serbian Constitution 
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states that “The Republic of Serbia shall protect the rights and interests of its citizens in abroad. The 
Republic of Serbia shall develop and promote relations of Serbs living abroad with the kin state.”63 
While Serbia is by no means the only state that promotes and protects its citizens abroad, the problematic 
relationship of Serbia and its neighbours makes this situation more complicated. As demonstrated in the 
case of Croatia, when Serbia and the neighbouring state come to joint agreements it will also benefit the 
Serb community in the latter. When looking at Kosovo it can also be argued that Serbia’s denial of 
Kosovo’s independence affects many Serbs negatively. It impedes Kosovo Serb refugees in Serbia from 
returning to their homes, because of the problematic security situation in Kosovo resulting from the 
province’s unclear status. It also disadvantages Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo, who are still seen as traitors 
by the majority Albanians. Many Serbs in the South of Kosovo have started to cooperate with the 
Kosovar institutions and have gained some autonomy from the decentralization process. Furthermore, 
Serbia’s engagement with the Serbs in Kosovo also disadvantages the ordinary citizens in Northern 
Kosovo, since this is more and more becoming a lawless zone where organized crime, criminal gangs, 
and corruption are ever more prominent.64 As the key to regional stability in the Western Balkans 
remains in Serbia’s hands, engagement with the Serbs in the near neighborhood will be of key 
importance for the promotion of peace, cooperation, and reconciliation across the region.65  
In addition to the role of Serbia, it is important to highlight the role of international actors in the 
integration of the Serb community in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo. As was discussed above, Bosnia’s 
and Kosovo’s institutional provisions were de facto developed directly by international actors, meaning 
they had a massive influence on the institutional elements that ensure Serb integration. In both countries 
Serbs enjoy a high quality of autonomy, including territorial autonomy, reserved seats, veto rights, and 
inclusion in government. In the case of Croatia, international actors played a less direct role, although 
the Badinter Commission and later the EU pushed for an improvement of Serb rights in Croatia. Hence, 
the quadratic nexus, as discussed above, remains a useful framework for the discussion on Serb 
integration in the three countries under consideration.  
 Finally, it is important to highlight that the integration of the Serb community in Bosnia, Croatia, 
and Kosovo also allows us to draw some important conclusions about the democratization of these three 
countries. Most notably the case of Croatia demonstrates that the focus on a stronger political and 
institutional participation for the Serb community was the result of political change at elite level. Of 
course their smaller number and their status as a national minority made it much easier to integrate them 
in the new state after the end of the Tuđjman regime. In Bosnia, there has been a gradual change towards 
                                                     
63 The Serbian Constitution is available at: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=191258, 
26.08.2012.  
64 ICG, North Kosovo: Dual Sovereignty in Practice, Europe Report No. 211 (2011), available at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/kosovo/211-north-kosovo-dual-sovereignty-in-
practice.aspx, 24.08.2012.  
65 Mladen MLADENOV, An Orpheus Syndrome? Serbian Foreign Policy after the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
IN: Soeren KEIL and Bernhard STAHL (eds) The Foreign Policies of the Post-Yugoslav States – From 
Yugoslavia to Europe, Basingstoke 2014 (forthcoming).  
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more centralization and fewer ethno-national policy spaces in the political system. While this was seen 
foremost against Serb and Croat nationalists it is a wider phenomenon in the democratization process of 
the country. Bosnia’s democratization has focused on more intra-group competition and a stronger need 
for elite cooperation at the central level. The Bosnian Serbs have seen political change from the Serb 
Democratic Party (SDS) towards the currently dominating Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) of 
Milorad Dodik. The two parties differ only marginally in their rhetoric and focus on the protection of 
the rights of Serbs and of the RS. Dodik’s demand for more autonomy for the RS and his continued 
focus on overall reform of the state demonstrates that neither democracy, nor the Bosnian state is fully 
consolidated. Similar conclusions can be reached for Kosovo, where the unwillingness of Serbs in the 
North to accept the Kosovar state demonstrates that Kosovo remains contested, both internally among 
Albanians and Serbs, and externally among those that recognize Kosovo as an independent state and 
those that see Kosovo as part of Serbia.  
 
The case of Croatia demonstrates that a number of conditions must be met before Serb integration 
promises to be successful. First, the acceptance of the Serb community as an integral part of the country’s 
population is a key precondition. While Kosovo and Bosnia recognize the Serbs formally, many 
Albanians still see Serbs as oppressors and murderers and are suspicious of their long-term motives. In 
Bosnia, Serbs are protected as a constituent people but their territorial unit, the RS, remains challenged 
from numerous sites that claim it is the result of genocide during the war in Bosnia. While a long-term 
territorial reform might be useful in Bosnia, the current acceptance of the RS and its role as the protector 
of Serbian interests in Bosnia would be a first step to recognize the needs and fears of the Serbian 
community in Bosnia. Yet, more recent challenges to the use of the Serbian language and the Cyrillic 
alphabet in Croatia demonstrate that even in this country, which became an EU Member State in July 
2013, Serb integration remains contested and not without its problems. Second, the relationship between 
the new state and Serbia is of key importance. The democratization of Croatia and Serbia resulted in 
improved relations between the two states, which also benefited the Serbs in Croatia. A key problem in 
the ‘triadic nexus’, that is between the new states (Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo), the Serb community 
in these countries, and Serbia, is the lack of a coordinated dialogue. While some attempts have been 
made to coordinate policy between Croatia and Serbia, and also between Bosnia and Serbia, overall 
there remains a lack of trust and willingness to work together. The situation between Kosovo and Serbia 
is even more problematic, since direct dialogue is undermined by the fundamentally different approaches 
to Kosovo’s status.  
 
Conclusion 
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While the situation in the Western Balkans is specific and certainly the situation in each of the three 
countries is somewhat unique, there are nevertheless some important lessons that can be learnt from the 
integration of the Serbs into the new states of Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo.  
First, the improvement of inter-ethnic relations, including reconciliation and transitional justice, 
remains of key importance for the integration of Serbs in the new states. Fundamental questions, such 
as those relating to accusations of “guilt”, are connected to these processes, but there are also some more 
basic elements, such as property return, support for inter-ethnic initiatives, and the celebration of ethnic 
diversity as a value in itself. Second, the integration of the Serb community is also linked to the processes 
of democratization and state-building. Minority rights are a relatively new concept for a geographical 
area that was ruled by one party for a long time and in which a complex system of ethnic power-sharing 
and communist ideology attempted to forestall ethnic conflict. For Bosnian, Croatian, and Kosovar elites 
minority rights are nothing more than a key demand made by the international community. There is not 
yet an understanding of minority rights as an essential element of democracy. This has to develop over 
time and requires fundamental changes in inter-ethnic relations and indeed in the political culture.  
Thirdly, while institutional mechanisms, such as reserved seats in parliament or participation in 
government, do help, they are not by themselves enough to ensure minority integration. Kosovo is a 
good example of this, since the Serbs that are represented in Kosovo’s institutions do not necessarily 
represent the majority of Serbs in Kosovo. This raises more fundamental questions about legitimacy and 
democracy. In particular, it highlights the wider debate about how to ensure the representation of certain 
groups (quotas, reserved seats, etc.), which puts into question fundamental principles of liberal 
democracy. Moreover, it raises the issue of group representation – if groups are represented in certain 
institutions, how can it be ensured that the representatives from that group truly represent the majority 
view of the group? And in what respects should group rights be privileged over individual human rights?  
Finally, the international community still has much to do in the promotion of minority rights 
and state-building in the post-conflict societies of the Western Balkans. While the leverage of the EU 
and other international actors has resulted in a substantial improvement of the situation of Serbs in 
Croatia and to some extent also in Kosovo, there is nevertheless a lack of full engagement by 
governments in the question of minority integration and participation. The limited impact of the EU on 
the constitutional reform process in Bosnia, in particular in relation to the Sejdić-Finci decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights, demonstrates a lack of involvement in fundamental questions about 
minority rights.66 As this paper has revealed, in order to understand the situation of a certain ethnic group 
in “new” states after violent state dissolution, the “quadratic nexus” proves a useful tool in order to 
analyse complex relationships. In particular, the different institutional mechanisms used in Bosnia, 
Croatia, and Kosovo for the integration of the Serb community cannot be fully understood without taking 
                                                     
66 The European Human Rights Court ruled in December 2009 that the composition of the Bosnian State 
Presidency and the House of Peoples is discriminatory since it excludes certain groups. Finci, a Jew and Sejdić, a 
member of the Bosnian Roma community argued that they are politically discriminated because they cannot stand 
for office in these two institutions. The Court agreed with them and demanded that Bosnia changes its Constitution.  
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the role of international actors into account. They played a key rule during constitutional engineering 
(in Bosnia and Kosovo) and in the post-war state-building phase in all three countries. In particular, they 
had a substantial impact on the rules and regulations that frame Serb community integration in the three 
countries.  
To achieve a long-term change in the perception of minorities more generally, and in the process 
of Serb integration in the three states specifically, is the EU’s goal. It has a strategic commitment to 
initiate reform processes that will be of fundamental importance for progressing the democratization 
and Europeanization of the region. Certainly, regional cooperation will be important, in addition to the 
support for reconciliation and other mechanisms that improve inter-ethnic relations. Long-term changes 
need time and determination from all sides. The case of the Serb communities in Bosnia, Croatia, and 
Kosovo demonstrates this very clearly.  
 
 
 
 
 
